Earlier this week, on January 12, 2020, the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) announced the release of its final rule revising and updating its regulations interpreting joint employer status under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). According to DOL, “The final rule provides updated guidance for determining joint employer status when an employee performs work for his or her employer that simultaneously benefits another individual or entity, including guidance on the identification of certain factors that are not relevant when determining joint employer status.” The DOL published its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) on April 9, 2019, and received over 12,000 comments within the 30-day comment period. The final rule becomes effective on March 16, 2020, 60 days after publication in the Federal Register today, January 16, 2020.
As a threshold matter, under the FLSA, an employee working for one company may be found to be the joint employee of a second, independent company, depending on the nature and extent of control over the employee’s work. Joint employer status is important for numerous reasons, including the fact that a joint employer can be held joint and severally liable for FLSA wage and hour obligations. In 1958, DOL published an interpretive regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 791, explaining that joint employer status depends on whether multiple persons are “not completely disassociated” or “acting entirely independently of each other” with respect to the employee’s employment.
Specifically, the regulation provided three situations where two or more employers are generally considered joint employers: (1) where there is an arrangement between the employers to share the employee’s services (e.g., to interchange employees); (2) where one employer is acting directly or indirectly in the interest of the other employer (or employers) in relation to the employee; or (3) where the employers are not completely disassociated with respect to the employment of a particular employee and may be deemed to share control of the employee, directly or indirectly, by reason of the fact that one employer controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with the other employer. The DOL issued its NPRM out of concern that Continue reading
Last month, a waitress, Brittany Spencer, was fired after refusing to serve transphobic customers at a Fat Joe’s Bar and Grill in Fond du Lac, Wisconsin, raising questions as to whether the restaurant engaged in impermissible discrimination by doing so. During her shift, Spencer was asked by a couple of patrons sitting at one of her tables what she thought of a transgender customer sitting at the bar. According to Spencer, the couple asked her if she thought it was “disgusting and wrong,” and asked why the restaurant would “let someone like that into the establishment,” to which Spencer answered that she did not agree and walked away. When Spencer asked her manager if another employee could serve the table because she was uncomfortable, her manager said no, and Spencer decided to leave. That night, Spencer shared what had happened on Facebook, stating that she was sent home for refusing to serve the customers, and the following day, Spencer was alerted by restaurant management that she had been fired. The restaurant claims that it fired Spencer for “refusing to do the duty [it] hired her for.” Spencer has filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).
Before diving into the analysis of Spencer’s potential discrimination claim, it is important to understand what she would be required to show. As we have previously posted, as with almost all claims of discrimination, Spencer will likely seek to prove her case through the use of indirect evidence under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, requiring her to show that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) the unfavorable action gave rise to an inference of discrimination. The question, however, will likely turn on Continue reading
Hurricane Dorian is approaching the Southeastern United States, and first and foremost, employers need to make sure their employees, customers, and guests are safe from the storm.
Natural disasters such as hurricanes, earthquakes and tornadoes have posed unique human resource (HR) challenges from wage-hour to FMLA leave and the WARN Act. The best protection is to have a plan in place in advance to ensure your employees are paid and well taken care of during a difficult time.
Although no one can ever be fully prepared for such natural disasters, it is important to be aware of the federal and state laws that address these situations. Our guidance can be used by employers in navigating through the legal and business implications created by events such as hurricanes. In addition, the information may be applicable to other crises and disasters, such as fires, flu epidemics and workplace violence.
Frequently Asked Questions
If a work site is closed because of the weather or cannot reopen because of damage and/or loss of utilities, am I required to pay affected employees?
The Fair Labor Standards Act requires employers to pay their non-exempt employees only for hours that the employees have actually worked. Therefore, an employer is not required to pay nonexempt employees if it is unable to provide work to those employees due to a natural disaster.
An exception to this general rule exists when there are employees who receive fixed salaries for fluctuating workweeks. These are nonexempt employees who have agreed to work a specified number of hours for a specified salary. An employer must pay these employees their full weekly salary for any week in which any work was performed.
For exempt employees, an employer will be required to pay the employee’s full salary if the work site is closed or unable to reopen due to inclement weather or other disasters for less than a full workweek. However, an employer may require exempt employees to use available leave for this time. Continue reading
As we reported back in March, Judge Chutkan of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia lifted the stay on the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (“EEOC’s”) 2016 final rule mandating that employers who are required to submit an annual Employer Information Report (“EEO-1”) also submit pay data by sex, ethnicity, and race. This additional piece of the EEO-1 Report has come to be known as “Component 2.” After the Judge lifted the stay, the EEOC responded that it would not be in a position to accept the EEO-1 Component 2 by May 31, 2019 – the deadline to submit the standard data set collected through the EEO-1 Report (“Component 1”) – and adjusted the deadline to submit Component 2 data to September 30, 2019. Judge Chutkan reluctantly accepted this timeline and mandated that two years of data be collected by this date. Accordingly, the EEOC provided notice that it would be requiring employers to submit pay data for calendar years 2017 and 2018 by or before September 30, 2019.
Despite the fact that collecting this data could be very burdensome for employers, the EEOC’s deadline provided only a matter of months in which to gather and submit it. Now, with just over a month to spare, covered employers must ensure they understand what data needs to be submitted, how to tabulate the data for submission, and how to ultimately submit the data to the EEOC. Continue reading
On May 10, 2019, the D.C. Circuit issued its opinion in Figueroa v. Pompeo, 923 F.3d 1078 (D.C. Cir. 2019), raising the bar for employers to articulate legitimate non-discriminatory business reasons for taking alleged unlawful actions against plaintiffs. As we explained in a prior post, under the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework, after the plaintiff makes his/her prima facie case of discrimination, the employer has an opportunity to rebut plaintiff’s prima facie case by articulating legitimate non-discriminatory business reasons for taking the alleged discriminatory action. And, if the employer is able to do that, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the employer’s stated reasons are a pretext for discrimination. Figueroa now makes it more difficult for employers to successfully argue that the actions they took were for legitimate non-discriminatory business reasons. So, what happened in the case, and what should employers do going forward?
The facts of the case are straightforward. Figueroa, a Puerto Rican employee, alleged that his employer, the State Department, discriminatorily passed him over for promotions. At the trial court level, the State Department moved for summary judgment, claiming that it did not discriminate against Figueroa, but rather decided not to promote him because other candidates were better qualified. The State Department explained that candidates for promotion are ranked based on substantive criteria called “core precepts.” These precepts consist of six performance areas: (1) leadership skills; (2) managerial skills; (3) interpersonal skills; (4) communication and foreign language skills; (5) intellectual skills; and (6) substantive knowledge. The State Department explained that, although Figueroa
On Monday, April 22, 2019, the United States Supreme Court granted petitions for certiorari for three cases that center on the question of whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) protects LGBT rights. Two of the cases, Altitude Express v. Zarda and Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, concern whether, under Title VII, sex discrimination includes discrimination on the basis of an employee’s sexual orientation. The third case, R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. v. EEOC, poses the question of whether the Title VII prohibition against sex discrimination prohibits gender identity discrimination. Due to the similarity of the issues, the Supreme Court has consolidated the Altitude Express and Bostock matters for briefing and oral argument. The Supreme Court’s ultimate decision in each of these three matters is significant because it will settle current Circuit splits, as well as disagreement among Agencies in the Federal government, on the scope of Title VII.
As discussed in a prior blog post, in Altitude Express, the Second Circuit joined the Seventh Circuit in finding that Title VII does protect employees from being discriminated against based on sexual orientation. Specifically, the Second Circuit held that the text of Title VII necessarily includes sexual orientation as “…the most natural reading of [Title VII]’s prohibition on discrimination ‘because of…sex’ is that it extends to sexual orientation discrimination because sex is necessarily a factor in sexual orientation.” The Seventh Circuit in Hively v. Tech Community College, similarly determined that a reading of Title VII in the current cultural and legal context includes sexual orientation in the scope of Title VII. Continue reading
On Monday, March 25, 2019, I had the privilege to co-present on reasonable accommodations and the interactive process under the Americans with Disabilities Act (the “ADA”) at the HR in Hospitality Conference in Las Vegas, Nevada. One of the issues covered during our presentation involved the fact that the ADA does not require that employers provide the specific accommodation requested by an employee as long as the employer offers a reasonable accommodation to the employee who made the request. While employers can use their business judgment when deciding how best to reasonably accommodate an employee, a settlement recently announced by the EEOC underscores that many employers would be well-advised to develop internal procedures or guidelines to help ensure that those involved in the accommodation process understand what is expected of them and the company when responding to accommodation requests. According to a lawsuit filed by EEOC in Minnesota, a Bath and Body Works store failed to reasonably accommodation a sales associate with type-1 diabetes suffering retinopathy who asked that a larger monitor screen be placed at the cash register. Instead, a store manager purchased what the EEOC described as “a cheap, hand-held magnifying glass” to be used by the sales associate when working the register.
Under a consent decree settling the suit (EEOC v. Bath and Body Works), Bath and Body Works agreed to pay Continue reading