Employers are increasingly turning to artificial intelligence (“AI”) for assistance in making employment decisions, and although AI can eliminate disparate treatment, employers should be aware of the potential for disparate impact. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy, sexual orientation, and gender identity), or national origin in employment practices (recruiting, hiring, monitoring, transferring, evaluating, terminating).

While New York City is the only jurisdiction that regulates the use of AI in employment decisions, there is EEOC guidance on the use of AI in the workplace and as a result of President Biden’s October 30, Executive Order we expect the Secretary of Labor to issue best practices around the use of AI in employment decisions soon.

New York City

New York City Local Law 144 regulates the use of automated employment decision tools. Automated employment decisions tools are “any computational process, derived from machine learning, statistical modeling, data analytics, or artificial intelligence, that issues simplified output, including a score, classification, or recommendation, that is used to substantially assist or replace discretionary decision making for making employment decisions that impact natural persons.”

Under Local Law 144 employers or employment agencies that use an automated employment decision tool to screen a candidate or employee for an employment decision must: Continue reading →

Title VII plaintiffs in the Fifth Circuit are no longer required plead disparate treatment in an ultimate employment decision.

In Hamilton v. Dallas County, the en banc court overturned decades of precedent and articulated a new employee-friendly rule for Title VII disparate treatment claims—“a plaintiff plausibly alleges a disparate treatment claim under Title VII if she pleads discrimination in hiring, firing, compensation, or the ‘terms, conditions, or privileges’ of her employment.”

The Standard Articulated by the Hamilton Court

• “To adequately plead an adverse employment action, plaintiffs need not allege discrimination with respect to an ‘ultimate employment decision.’ Instead, a plaintiff need only show that she was discriminated against, because of a protected characteristic, with respect to hiring, firing, compensation, or the ‘terms, conditions, or privileges of employment’—just as the statute says.”
• “The days and hours that one works are quintessential ‘terms and conditions’ of one’s employment”
• “We thus leave for another day the precise level of minimum workplace harm a plaintiff must allege on top of showing discrimination in one’s ‘terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.’”

Background

The Dallas County Sheriff’s Department (“Department”) gives its detention officers two days off each week. Prior to 2019, detention officers’ days off were determined by seniority. In 2019, the Department eliminated the seniority system and days off were determined by sex—only men were allowed to take off Saturday and Sunday. Women could not elect to have both of their days off on the weekend.

Nine female detention officers sued the Department, alleging that the sex-based scheduling policy violated Title VII’s prohibition against sex discrimination. The trial court granted the County’s motion to dismiss, reasoning that the scheduling policy was not an “ultimate employment decision.” Under Fifth Circuit precedent, alleged conduct violated Title VII if it was an “ultimate employment decision” such as hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting, and compensating. The Fifth Circuit panel affirmed the trial court’s dismissal, noting that this case was the “ideal vehicle” for an en banc court to align the Circuit’s precedent with the meaning of Title VII’s text. The Fifth Circuit panel explained that “[s]urely allowing men to have full weekends off, but not women, on the basis of sex rather than a neutral factor like merit or seniority, constitutes discrimination with respect to the terms or conditions of those women’s employment.”

En Banc Decision Continue reading →

The Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (“PWFA”) was signed by President Biden on December 29, 2022, and takes effect on June 27, 2023. The PWFA requires covered employers to provide a reasonable accommodation to the known limitations of a qualified employee related to pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions unless the accommodation would pose an undue hardship on the operation of the business.

Below is a summary of the PWFA.

Who is a covered employer?

A covered employer is an employer with at least 15 employees. Employers may look to EEOC regulations related to Title VII and how courts interpret employers under Title VII for purposes of determining coverage as the PWFA explicitly references the Title VII definition of employer.

What does the PWFA require?

Under Title VII employers cannot discriminate against an employee based on pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions. Likewise, employers covered by Title VII must treat an employee affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions the same as other workers with similar abilities or an inability to work.

“R-E-S-P-E-C-T. Find out what it means to me.” More than half a century after Aretha Franklin first sang those lyrics, state legislatures, local municipalities, and Congress are passing the Creating a Respectful and Open Workplace for Natural Hair legislation (“CROWN Act”). Before the flurry of legislation aimed at protecting natural hair, some appellate courts already applied the protections of Title VII liberally. In Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mut. Hosp. Ins., the 7th Circuit held a plaintiff’s EEOC charge sufficiently alleged race discrimination where plaintiff’s EEOC charge stated plaintiff’s boss denied plaintiff a promotion because plaintiff “could never represent [defendant] with [an] Afro.” 538 F.2d 164, 168 (7th Cir. 1976). Other courts, however, took a narrower approach. In EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions, the 11th Circuit reasoned “Title VII protects persons in covered categories with respect to their immutable characteristics, but not their cultural practice[,]” thereby upholding a race neutral grooming policy that prohibited dreadlocks. 852 F.3d 1018, 1028-34 (11th Cir. 2016). Indeed, as recently as 2018, the U.S. Armed Forces maintained grooming policies that prohibited natural or protective hairstyles commonly worn by Black servicemembers because the hairstyles were “unkempt.”

The CROWN Act

More than a dozen state legislatures already passed a variation of the CROWN Act Continue reading →